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SURVEY OF 1974 SECURITIES LAW
DEVELOPMENTS
I. DEFINITION OF A "SECURITY"
Although many courts in 1974 dealt with the perennial question
of what constitutes a "security," no clear definition has yet evolved.'
However, recent decisions indicate a further liberalization of the four
criteria originally enunciated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co. 2 In that case, the Supreme Court provided the basic
framework for determining the existence of a "security," stating that
a transaction involves a "security," -or more specifically an "invest-
ment contract," 3 if the transaction is one whereby a person (1) invests
his money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect profits
(4) solely from the efforts of others.4 While recent decisions have
refined each of these criteria, no conclusive definition encompassing
all four has emerged.'
A. "A person invests his money"
The requirement that "a person invest his money" embodies an
inherent distinction between investment and commercial activity.
Because the securities acts' were intended to protect investors, some
courts have applied this distinction in attempting to determine
I Both §2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, and §3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 provide similar definitions of a "security." 15 U.S.C. §§77b(1),
78c(a)(10)(1970). Determining whether a particular transaction involves the sale of
securities is of great importance since the registration requirements of §5 of the 1933
Act and §12 of the Exchange Act, and the sanctions against fraudulent practices
provided in both acts, apply only to securities. 15 U.S.C. §§77e, 781 (1970). Most of
the litigation involving the meaning of "security," has centered around a definition of
the term "investment contract" which is one enumerated example of a "security"
under the acts. See note 3 infra.
2 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
3 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act, and §3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act define a
"security" to include the rather broad concept of an "investment contract." See note
1 supra.
328 U.S. at 298-99.
One commentator has stated that in defining a security "[W]e are somewhat
in the same position as some of the members of the United States Supreme Court when
dealing with obscenity: We can generally tell a security when we see one, on a case by
case basis, but have been unwilling to attempt to give a generic definition to the term."
Long, Student Symposium on Securities: Introduction, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 95, 96 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Long].
' Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa(1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78hh(1970).
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whether a "security" exists, particularly in cases involving promis-
sory notes. Invoking the qualifying language "unless the context oth-
erwise requires," which prefaces the definition of a security in §2(1)
of the 1933 Act,7 courts have held that the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a promissory note must be examined to determine
the real nature of the instrument. If the note is executed in connec-
tion with a commercial transaction it will not be considered a secu-
rity,' but if executed as part of an investment scheme the note will
be regarded as a security.' A refinement of this basic approach has
recently been adopted by the Seventh Circuit.1 ° The court has formu-
7 See note 1 supra.
8 McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1975) (note and deed of trust resulting from $200,000 loan
by bank to a corporation); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir.
1974) (note and deed of trust resulting from bank loan to the Bellahs to aid them in
developing their livestock business); Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp.
250, 255 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (note resulting from bank loan to a commercial enterprise).
The court in Tourtelot stressed that although the note involved was not a security, an
agreement by numerous banks to participate in the note transaction ("loan participa-
tion agreement") would indicate the investment rather than commercial nature of such
a transaction. Id. at 254-55.
1 Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1914) (note resulting from plaintiff's
loan of funds to defendants to promote a real estate investment corporation); Hall v.
Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974) (notes, secured by mort-
gages and payable to defendant, resulting from the purchase of lots by the makers from
the defendant, which defendant then indorsed and sold across the country).
In Safeway Portland Employees' Fed. Credit Union v. C. H. Wagner & Co., 501
F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1974), the court considered an entire investment package a security,
although part of the package represented a commercial transaction. The plaintiff was
induced by defendant to purchase bank certificates of deposit, after having been prom-
ised that he would receive from the defendant an added interest rate of %% separate
from the bank's normal rate on certificates of deposit of 7-1/2%. The court considered
the certificates of deposit and the bonus together, and held that because the bonus
satisfied the elements of a security, the whole package was a security. In reaching its
conclusion, the court stressed the importance of analyzing the economic inducement
which led the investor to make his investment. Id. at 1122-23.
"* C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,938 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 1975). The court in this case stated:
[Bluying shares of the common stock of a publicly-held corporation,
where the impetus for the transaction comes from the person with the
money, is an investment; borrowing money from a bank to finance the
purchase of an automobile, where the impetus for the transaction
comes from the person who needs the money, is a loan. In between is
a gray area which, in the absence of further congressional indication
of intent or Supreme Court construction, has been and must be in the
future subjected to case-by-case treatment.
Id. at 97,246.
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lated an "impetus" test to assist in distinguishing between invest-
ment and commercial transactions. When the transaction arises as a
result of the borrower's need for cash, the resulting promissory note
is not a security. However, if the impetus for the transaction is the
investor's desire to "lend" money, the resulting promissory note is a
security.
Although primarily applied in promissory note cases, the
investment-commercial distinction should be considered whenever
the existence of a "security" is in issue." Cases have often been de-
cided by focusing on the other three criteria in the Howey formulation
without considering this fundamental distinction, as recent decisions
involving pyramid schemes and franchise arrangements amply illus-
trate. While pyramid schemes generally have been held to involve
securities, 12 courts have consistently held that franchise arrange-
ments do not fall within that definition. 3 In analyzing both types of
arrangements, courts have ignored the investment-commercial dis-
tinction and have instead focused on the efforts of the investor in the
venture."
The danger inherent in such an approach is that situations may
arise in which consideration of the investors' efforts will not result in
clear differentiation between pyramid and franchise arrangements.
For example, in a recent case the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that a transaction was a franchise simply because it was termed
a franchise in the agreement between the parties." A consideration
of the investors' efforts, however, indicated a substantial similarity
to arrangements which courts have traditionally regarded as pyramid
schemes. Regardless of the decision in this case, the court could have
" One commentator has provided what he terms a definition of a "security by
specification" in which he stresses the importance of making the investment-
commercial distinction. Long supra note 5, at 96.
22 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Steed
Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,917 (N.D. IM. Oct. 15, 1974); Davis v. Avco
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974). The leading case holding that pyramid
schemes involve securities is SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
11 Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Plum Tree, Inc. v.
Seligson, 383 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Pa. 1974); L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395
(D.N.J. 1974). The case most often cited for the proposition that franchise arrange-
ments do not involve securities is Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir.
1973).
" See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.
s A.B.A. Auto Lease Corp v. Adam Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,959
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1975).
1975]
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provided a sounder basis for its decision by considering the
investment-commercial distinction. 18
B. "In a common enterprise"
The Howey formulation also requires that the investors invest
their funds in a "common enterprise." However, the ambiguity in
this term has led courts to develop two entirely different interpreta-
tions of the common enterprise requirement. One interpretation
views commonality in a vertical sense by requiring an interdepend-
ence between the "fortunes of the investor" and the "efforts and
success" of the promoters." The other stresses horizontal commonal-
ity, and requires that the fortunes of any one investor be directly
related to the success or failure of the other investors. 8
The conflicting judicial formulations of the commonality require-
ment recently led two district courts to reach contradictory conclu-
sions as to the nature of discretionary commodity accounts." In
Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co.,2 the Southern District of Iowa held
that such an account was a "security" since the commonality require-
ment had been met as between the investors and the promoters of the
scheme, notwithstanding the lack of any pooling of funds among the
"6 In El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974), the transaction had all the indicia of a commercial loan yet closer
consideration of the facts revealed that the loan was part of a larger investment scheme
between the borrower and the lender. See text accompanying notes 31-34 infra. Al-
though the other three Howey criteria presented the court with problems in analysis,
a clearer approach could have been adopted through consideration of the investment-
commercial distinction.
11 See Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,088 (D. Md.
Ja. 8, 1975). In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), the
Fifth Circuit stated: "The critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence of investor
input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts." Id. at 478. See
SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,980 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 1975).
IS See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972); Long supra note 5, at 123-25. This interpretation has led to the
requirement that there be a pooling of the investors' funds. Long supra note 5, at 123-
25.
1, Commodity futures contracts are not considered securities. See, e.g., Sinva, Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
However, the cases here discussed involved discretionary commodity accounts in
which investors open accounts with futures commission merchants, using securities or
cash, and authorize the merchants to act as their agents (although the agents virtually
act on their own) in buying and selling, and otherwise trading in commodities futures
contracts on the commodities exchanges.
20 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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various accounts.2 In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,2 however,
the Northern District of Illinois disagreed with the view taken in
Marshall and concluded that since commonality among the investors
themselves was lacking, the discretionary commodities accounts were
not securities. The Marshall view is arguably more consistent with
the legislative intent underlying the securities acts, since that view
protects investors whether or not there is horizontal commonality and
pooling of funds.?
C. "Is led to expect profits"
This element of the Howey test involves primarily a determina-
ii In recognizing the remedial purpose of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the court stated:
At the very least, it is equally as plausible to conclude that the ele-
ment of a "common enterprise" is satisfied when a single investor
commits his funds to a promoter in hope of making a profit as to
conclude that the investor protection afforded by the '33 and '34 Acts
and the complex regulatory scheme developed thereunder is available
only to those hapless capitalists who are not alone in their misfortune.
Id. at 489. See note 18 supra; SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1974). Cf. SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974). The latter two
cases involved whiskey warehouse receipts in which the investor paid for an identified
cask of whiskey, which would be managed for him in the whiskey market by the
promoters of the investment scheme. The structure of these whiskey investment
schemes, which involved no pooling of funds to purchase the whiskey, seems to support
the Marshall view of commonality.
" CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,738 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1974). In rejecting the plain-
tiff's claim, the court reaffirmed the necessity for the pooling of funds by stating:
The contractual agreement between the parties makes no reference to
any proposed commingling of funds or a joint account with other
investors, but speaks solely in terms of a single account, limited to
plaintiff's investment. Further, although defendants may have en-
tered into similar discretionary arrangements with other investors,
there is no suggestion that the success or failure of those other con-
tracts directly affected the profitability of plaintiff's investment.
Id. at 96,453 (citation omitted).
"3 An important consideration in this regard is the manner in which the invest-
ment scheme is represnted to the potential investor. If a pooling of funds is represented
although in actuality no pooling occurs, the standards in both the Hirk and Marshall
cases could be satisfied, depending on whether the court considered the representations
or the realities of the scheme. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra. But see Glazer
v. National Commodity Research & Statistical Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,978 (N.D. ill. Sept 5, 1974); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.
Ill. 1974). In both cases, which involved commodities futures contracts, the district
court held that the pooling of investors' funds by the defendants, without any authori-
zation from the investors, did not satisfy the commonality requirement due to the lack
of a "common purpose."
1975]
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tion of when there is an expectation of "profits" in a transaction. 4
Various 1974 decisions extended the parameters of the term "profits"
to include a broader concept of "benefits."25
In 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson,5 the Second Circuit consid-
ered whether the "shares" in a housing cooperative were "securities."
The court applied the Howey test and found that two factors present
in the transaction under consideration satisfied the "profit" require-
ment: (1) the use of rental income to offset and reduce the periodic
assessments on the shareholders for the maintenance of the building,
and (2) the expectation of capital appreciation on a resale of the
shares in the cooperative. In making this determination, the court
was implementing a previously established policy treating such tang-
ible benefits as satisfying the "profit" requirement.Y
In another Second Circuit decision, Forman v. Community Serv-
ices, Inc. ,5 the concept of profits was expanded to include less tangi-
ble benefits accruing to shareholders in a cooperative. While no possi-
bility of capital appreciation of the shares held by the "tenants" in
the cooperative existed, the Forman court concluded that a "secu-
rity" was present, since other elements of "profit" were present in the
housing cooperative scheme. These other elements included the po-
tential tax benefits which would result from the deduction of the
shareowner's pro rata share of the mortgage payment from his in-
come, and the rental "savings" by the shareowner as a result of living
in the cooperative rather than the more costly neighboring homes.
However, some doubt existed whether the shareowners in Forman
ever considered these elements "profits. '29 The United States Su-
" This element of the Howey test also implies a second consideration previously
discussed: that the likelihood of profits induced the investor to enter the transaction.
See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
Although both terms have approximately the same denotation, "benefits" con-
notes a broader spectrum of amenities.
503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
See El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974); Long supra
note 5, at 117-19.
500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nora., United Housing Founda-
tion Inc. v. Forman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975).
2There is no indication that the tenants could have benefitted by the tax deduc-
tion, due to the low and low-middle nature of their incomes. 500 F.2d at 1249. Likewise,
these tenants probably could not have afforded the other housing in the area, and
therefore, it is hardly persuasive to contend that they were actually saving something
by living in the cooperative. Furthermore, as in 1050 Tenants Corp., the court held that
the rental income which offset the carrying charges was also a "profit." However, for
a few years previous to the litigation, the carrying charges had been substantially
increasing and it seems unlikely that the tenants were aware of any reductions. While
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preme Court, in an apparent attempt to limit the expansiveness of
the "profit" requirement, recently reversed the Second Circuit deci-
sion in FormanY° Although the Supreme Court concluded that no
profits were involved in the Forman case,3' it also stated that the
shareowners never expected profits but rather bought the shares to
acquire subsidized low-cost living space in the cooperative. "In the
present case there can be no doubt that investors were attracted,
solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial
returns on their investments."3 This approach by the Supreme Court
is consonant with the current trend of stressing the expectation as-
pect of the "profit" requirement rather than merely determining if
profits or the potential therefore exists.
D. "Solely from the efforts of others"
While the final Howey criterion requires that profits result from
the efforts of persons other than the investors, a recent Ninth Circuit
decision, El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp.,3 rejected the con-
tention that profits must also vary with the efforts of others.Y In that
case, pursuant to an agreement, El Khadem supplied Nationwide
Investment Corporation with cash, including prepaid interest, and
securities as collateral for a loan which she secured from Nationwide.
In addition, Nationwide had authority to rehypothecate El Khadem's
the facts of the case may satisfy an objective interpretation of "profits," it is difficult
to believe that these " profits" induced the persons to make their investments. See note
31 infra.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 43 U.S.L.W. 4742 (June 16, 1975).
' The Supreme Court rejected the view that the payment of mortgage interest,
with its consequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes profit, and also con-
cluded that the rental savings realized by living in the cooperative rather than other
housing could in no sense be considered profit. "In a real sense, it no more embodies
the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other
government subsidies." Id. at 4748.
Significantly, however, the Court also rejected treatment of the rental income
from the leasing of commercial facilities in the cooperative as profit. See note 29 supra.
While the Court conceded that this is the type of profit "traditionally associated with
a security investment," it based its conclusion on the observation that "nothing in the
record suggests that the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the leasing
fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-op City of the space rented." Id. at 4748
(emphasis added). This appears inconsistent, however, with the "expectation of prof-
its" terminology in Howey which merely requires the possibility of profit.
" Id. at 4747.
494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court analogyzed the situation to that of common stock and corporate
bonds; the fact that profits in the latter do not vary does not make them any less
securities. Id. at 1229.
19751
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collateral to the extent of her indebtedness, in furthering its own
business purposes. Although the return El Khadem received on the
collateral was fixed under the plan, she also "received a tax benefit
and investment leverage. '35 The court concluded that although El
Khadem received fixed profits, the Howey criterion had been met
since profits existed and "her risk of loss depended on [the defen-
dant's] management skills."36
For purposes of clearer analysis, the requirement of "solely from
the efforts of others" can be divided into two distinct elements:
"solely" and "from the efforts of others." Cases decided prior to 1974
established that the term "solely" was not to be applied literally.37
The Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. ,
3
expressed the policy of the courts to view the term realistically in
order to encompass those schemes which involve securities in sub-
stance if not in form.39 To formulate a workable standard, the Ninth
Circuit required a determination of "whether the efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise."4 Inherent in this requirement, as evidenced by the
use of the word "managerial," is the distinction between investment
schemes, in which investors exercise no managerial functions, and
commercial ventures which involve substantial managerial efforts on
the part of the participants. 1
The second element of this criterion involves a consideration of
the type of efforts provided by persons other than the investors. The
court in Glen Turner stated that these efforts should be managerial
in nature.2 Nevertheless, in Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group,
31 Id. at 1226.
11 Id. at 1229. It is not clear whether the court intended to imply that either profits
or risk must vary with the efforts of others.
37 See, e.g., SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
- 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
11 Id. at 481.
,o Id. at 482.
" The cases involving franchise arrangements and pyramid schemes illustrate this
distinction. See notes 12 and 13 supra. The franchisee has control over most manage-
rial decisions-hiring, firing, ordering, etc.-and therefore, is involved in a commercial
endeavor. In a pyramid scheme, however, the participant leaves the management
decisions to others and merely brings potential investors to induction meetings.
42 In Plum Tree, Inc. v. Seligson, 383 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court
distinguished pyramid schemes from franchise arrangements by stating: "A pyramid
sales scheme is found where the investment in the enterprise is made with the expecta-
tion of obtaining profits by the sale of the scheme to others rather than by an on-going
involvement with running a business. " Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
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Inc.," the Eighth Circuit held that a transaction involved "securi-
ties," despite the fact that the investors exercised certain managerial
functions. In Miller, the defendants had sold a mated pair of chinchil-
las to the plaintiffs, who were to raise and bieed the animals in
accordance with certain set procedures. The plaintiffs, in turn, were
to sell any mated pairs to the defendants, who would then sell them
to other prospective "chinchilla raisers." Although the scheme was
initially represented as involving minimal efforts by the plaintiffs,
the subsequent development of the project required the plaintiffs to
engage in certain managerial activities. Concluding that the repre-
sentation rather than the realities of the transaction controlled," the
Eighth Circuit held that a sale of securities was involved since the
efforts provided by persons other than the investors were essentially
manageriar.
E. Conclusion
In determining whether a particular transaction involves a "secu-
rity" two points are especially significant. First, the transaction must
be carefully scrutinized to determine if it involves an investment or
commercial venture. Such an examination will enable courts to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief under the securities acts,
or whether his remedy lies in state corporation law. Second, if the
manner in which a transaction is represented indicates the existence
of a "security," courts will disregard the realities of the situation and
base their decision on the representation. This approach reinforces
the Howey criterion requiring that an individual be "led to expect
profits" rather than merely receive the profits. 5
However, in A.B.A. Auto Lease Corp. v. Adam Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,959 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1975), a case involving facts similar to those in pyramid
schemes, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that a franchise arrange-
ment existed since it was termed such, and as a result, the court concluded that no
security existed. The plaintiffs entered a lease arrangement whereby they provided the
defendants with other lessees, and the defendants then consummated and supervised
the resulting lease transactions. Although the arrangement was similar to a pyramid
scheme the court noted that the plaintiffs were required to spend significant amounts
of time and money in setting up and operating an office, and were also required to
produce a certain number of leases, under the arrangement. The court concluded that
the fact the plaintiff's success or failure depended on their expenditure of substantial
time and money was sufficient to remove the arrangement from the definition of a
security.
494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 416.
See Sunriver Properties, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 79,691 (SEC Staff Reply Jan. 10, 1974), wherein the SEC stated that the mere
1975]
